In this paper the recent effect of the European Monetary Union on inward FDI-flows is examined. We use a difference-in-differences approach for both a gravity based-as well as a general equilibrium approach. The estimated results show that the introduction of the euro raises inward FDI by 14 to 16 percent within the euro area by 11 to 13 percent from non-member and weakly by 8 percent to non-member countries. Moreover the geographical effects of the euro are explored. The results show partial agglomeration tendencies for the euro area. There are also some indications of increased importance of vertical specialization in the sample.
Introduction
A large body of empirical literature on the e¤ects of EMU on trade is now forming, following the seminal paper by Rose (2000) . These include Bun and Klaasen (2002) , Barr et al. (2003) , Micco et al. (2003) and Flam and Nordström (2003) . Their results show that EMU has increased trade volume by a magnitude ranging between 15 and 38 percent. Moreover, this increase in trade has not been con…ned to member states only, but has extended to non-member countries as well. This paper will address an interrelated issue, namely whether EMU has had any e¤ects on foreign direct investment (FDI) ‡ows. FDI ‡ows can be considered to be interrelated with trade since, at least at the theoretical level, such ‡ows are often viewed either as a substitute for trade (horizontal FDI ) or as a complement to trade (vertical FDI ). In addition, it can give an indication of whether EMU creates better conditions for …rms making long-term investment decisions. One argument against ‡oating currencies is that higher exchange rate variability creates uncertainty that discourages international investment and trade. Fixing the exchange rate eliminates this risk, hence encouraging international investment and trade, as well as making …rms cost calculations and pricing decisions easier. Adopting a single currency is a very credible commitment to exchange rate stability and has the advantage of reducing transaction costs that would otherwise occur, irrespective of the degree of volatility. Both e¤ects should promote international investment, i.e. FDI ‡ows.
In spite of the intuitive appeal of the argument that lower exchange rate volatility will increase FDI ‡ows, empirical evidence regarding the e¤ects of EMU on FDI ‡ows, is currently absent. 1 The approach of this paper is novel since little or no research, to my knowledge, has been devoted to appraising the e¤ects of EMU on FDI ‡ows. From a broader perspective, the recent economic and policy debate, concerning the economic e¤ects of EMU on its member states, has been based on an increasing body of empirical evidence and this paper is an attempt to investigate yet another aspect of EMU.
We use a new dataset on FDI ‡ows, a panel of unilateral FDI ‡ows between 18 developed countries for the years 1992 to 2001 is gathered. Since we are trying to uncover potential e¤ects of an institutional reform, a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach suitable for identifying such structural changes, is used to gauge the e¤ects of EMU on inward FDI. The estimations are carried out both within a partial as well as a general equilibrium approach to FDI. The results of this study show that 1 A partial exception is Barr et al. (2003) that present some stylized facts concerning European FDI ‡ows.
EMU increases inward FDI ‡ows within the euro area by approximately 14 to 16 percent, inward FDI from member countries to non-members by 11 to 13 percent and a weak increase in inward FDI from non-member countries to member countries of around 8 percent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some stylized facts and basic concepts concerning FDI are presented. Section 3 discusses the data, and Section 4 considers the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the main results, whereas Section 6 deals with the robustness of these results. Section 7 combines trade and FDI data in order to examine potential economic geography e¤ects of the euro. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Basic concepts and stylized facts
An FDI is a cross-border investment made by an investor with the intent of obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another country. 2 In principle, when a …rm wishes to make sales abroad it has a variety of methods that can be employed, such as exporting, licensing, appointing agents or engaging in direct investment. FDIs are an equivalent to producing directly in the country one wishes to serve.
In latter years, FDI has become an increasingly important factor in the global economic activity, with growth rates for world FDI ‡ows that, by far, exceed those of GDP or trade ( Table 1 ) . This is true even in spite of the large drop that world FDI ‡ows experienced at the turn of the millennium.
Another interesting feature of the FDI ‡ows is that they have been primarily concentrated to developed economies ( Table 2 ) , which received about 70 percent of world in ‡ows during the '90s, and which, after several recent …nancial crises in developing countries, subsequently increased their share to more than 80 percent. 2 According to Eurostat, who follow the OECD benchmark de…nition of FDI (third edition), an international investment is classed as FDI when an investor owns ten percent or more of ordinary shares or voting rights in an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise abroad. 3 With the majority of FDI in ‡ows, 40 percent, to developing countries going to China. The developed countries share of world out ‡ows is of course even higher, ranging between 85 to 95 percent. See Markusen 2002, Ch. 1. The existence of FDI has several major explanations. One type is market oriented, where FDI gives companies access to foreign markets thus acting as a substitute for trade; this is the so called horizontal FDI. Another rationale for FDI is production oriented and driven by cost minimizing objectives, where global companies gain strategic advantage by shifting low paid jobs abroad while keeping high value added research at home thereby producing either parts of or the entire …nal product in low-cost areas; this is the so called vertical FDI. Finally, a third rationale implies that the mode of outsourcing depends on the market structure, where oligopolistic or monopolistic markets have pro…ts, while competitive markets have lower costs. The distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI is a theoretical construct. 4 A …rm engaging in horizontal FDI is said to sell its products solely in the foreign market, while a vertical FDI serves the home market. It is a construct insofar as no FDI acts solely as either and the debate about whether most FDI act as if they were horizontal or vertical is not settled.
From a theoretical perspective two main areas are at the forefront of the literature on FDI. The …rst explores the rationale behind the existence and consequences of multinational activity within a general equilibrium framework. 5 This consists, mainly, of attempts to incorporate FDI into the new trade theory of economic geography and the models focus primarily on real factors of production. Questions concerning capital ‡ows, i.e. the …nancing decisions of the …rms are believed to be largely separable from decisions regarding the location of production and the direction of trade. The second focuses on ideas stemming from industrial organization theory, where FDI are studied with endogenous …rm organizations and general equilibrium models of industrial structures. 6 From the perspective of empirical analysis, there are again two main areas of research. The …rst concerns the determinants of FDI and can be derived either from a speci…c model or created in a more ad hoc manner, 7 and the second concerns the consequences of FDI on the economic environment. 8 Another bifurcation in the empirical literature occurs in the choice of FDI data, with researchers either using plant-level panel microdata or FDI ‡ows from the balance of payments (BoP). The former data is subject to smaller measurement errors, though its international availability is strictly limited. This forces us to turn to the latter data which is subject to larger measurement errors but is more readily available. Since the question to be addressed here is whether the European currency union has had an e¤ect on FDI ‡ows, a panel data approach is used. We utilize a coherent dataset of BoP FDI ‡ows from Eurostat that covers 18 countries for the years 1992-2001.
Data
Eurostat provides satisfactory data for bilateral and unilateral FDI for the eighteen reporting economies. Total FDI ‡ows are divided into three general subcategories, namely: Equity, Other Capital and Reinvested Earnings, with the third part showing gaps in availability due to misreporting. Hence in this paper the FDI ‡ows refer to Equity and Other Capital. All FDI ‡ows are net ‡ows, where net does not imply a net between a country pair (F DI ij F DI ji ) but implies rather, net of disinvestment.
Following the FDI and trade literature, these kind of regressions are usually conducted on bilateral data, but in order to increase the observations to two for each country pair in the empirical speci…cation one-way FDI ‡ows will be used, de…ned as inward FDI ‡ows, where an investment in country i from country j is represented as F DI ij and is viewed as an inward FDI from country i 0 s perspective. The inves- 6 9 This approximation is done by dividing the sample into three major entities, Europe, USA, Japan, calculating an average asymmetry between these and correcting each of the missing points by their average asymmetry. The new variables that are created are In ‡ows Corr and Out ‡ows Corr. The results obtained from these "corrected" series mirror those obtained from the raw data series which allows us to move on to the second step and take an average of the two new series, hence creating a new variable called Average Corr. In the second approach we use out ‡ows (in ‡ows) to instrument for in ‡ows ij (out ‡ows), which will give us consistent estimates even if measurement errors are present. The drawback of instrumenting is as usual the loss of e¢ ciency in the estimations. 10 Another issue with the data is caused by the erratic nature of FDI ‡ows between any country pair. In our case where FDI ‡ows are reported in millions of current US dollars, many ‡ows can be, and are, negative due to disinvestment. The negative values in the dependent variable precludes a conversion of the data set into a logarithmic scale. However, it is still possible to obtain elasticities for the point estimates, since the predicted means are positive values, by using the chain rule. This enables us to obtain a clear picture of the magnitude of the e¤ect due to the introduction of the euro. 9 See Appendix I and Appendix III Table A for methodological issues on asymmetries. 1 0 The results of and discussion conserning these attempts are found in Appendix III. 1 1 Logs of FDI are used many times in the litterature, usually when sales of multinational enterprises are used as a proxy for FDI. Here log form estimations are conducted both by simply converting the series into logs as well as by using a Heckman two-step approach. The results are presented in Appendix III Tables C1 and C2. Even if logging 9 
Empirical speci…cation
The introduction of the Euro can be viewed as a sharp change in the economic environment of the a¤ected countries. This change makes it appropriate for us to use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy. The idea behind this estimation strategy is to assess the e¤ect of the introduction of the euro on inward FDI for the euro-countries, while keeping the e¤ects for all other time-invariant variables, as well as common and country speci…c time-varying e¤ects constant, whether these are observables or unobservables. 12 A general speci…cation of this model can be expressed as:
where the dependent variable is F DI ij;t in millions of current US dollars. On the right hand side the explanatory variables include dummies to control for unobservable e¤ects, speci…cally a country pair e¤ect that is …xed over time ( ij ), in order to control for time-invariant unobservables, and a time e¤ect that is common to all countries ( t ), in order to control for time-speci…c unobservables. The set of explanatory variables (X ij;t ) comprises a constant and a subset of variables that have been found, in one way or another, to be signi…cant in explaining FDI ‡ows in prior empirical investigations.
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In the gravity regression approach these variables include measures of market size for each country Y it and Y jt that are represented by GDP in current millions of US dollars. Other variables in the set include a measure of capital-or …nancing ability for country j measured as country j's stockmarket value of listed companies, Stock jt and, in the hope that we might capture potential forward looking elements, a measure of payo¤ for investing in country i that is measured as the percentage change in country i's stockmarket value of listed companies, Stock it . Since the dependent variable is "one-way" FDI, a real exchange rate index is needed for country i and j, denoted by REX it and REX jt . The close link between trade and FDI suggests a measure of trade costs, de…ned as the inverse of trade openness from Penn World Tables, for both country i and country j, T radec i and T radec j to be used.
In the general equilibrium approach, the derived empirical speci…cation of Carr, explanatory variables capturing the long-run determinants of FDI are: the sum of the country-pair's current GDP, Y sum , the squared di¤erence of GDP, Y d 2 , the skill di¤erence of labor, skd, which is measured as the di¤erence in average number of years in school, the interaction term of skill di¤erence and GDP di¤erence, skd Y d, country i's investment cost, Invc i which is approximated by a composite index of bureaucracy, corruption and rule of law from the International Country Risk Guide, the trade cost for country i and j, as above, T radec i and T radec j , and …nally the interaction between trade costs and the square of skill di¤erence, T radec j skd 2 .
14 Finally, we have our variables of interest, EM U ij;t , with the accompanying vector of estimates ( ) that capture the e¤ect of the euro for the euro-area countries. The (EM U ij;t ) are time-varying dummies which take the value of zero prior to the introduction of the euro in 1999 or in the case of non-membership in the euro-area and one otherwise. There are three such dummy variables of primary interest here: one for inward FDI ‡ows from a euro countries to other euro countries (EMU11 ), one for inward FDI ‡ows to euro countries from non-euro countries (EMU12 ) and one for inward FDI ‡ows from euro countries to non-euro countries (EMU21 ). Hence we have three groups of countries and the point estimates of these variables represent the average e¤ect of the introduction of the euro. The control group is in this case represented by EMU(22) which is inward FDI ‡ows from non-euro countries to other non-euro countries and as such, EMU(22) is a vector of zeros and does not appear in the speci…cation. 15 All our speci…cation also include dummy variables that capture the EU's common market e¤ect, both for EU12 (EU 12in, EU 12out) as well as for Austria, Sweden and Finland (ASF in, ASF out). The EU12 dummy is zero in 1992 and one thereafter, while the ASF dummy takes a value of one after 1995. Hence the full model to be estimated is, in the gravity approach case:
T radec i;t + 6 T radec j;t + 7 REX i;t + 8 REX j;t + 9 EM U 11 ij;t + 10 EM U 12 ij;t + 11 EM U 21 ij;t + 12 EU 12in ij;t + 13 EU 12out ij;t + 14 ASF in ij;t + 15 ASF out ij;t + " ij;t in the general equilibrium case: 16 1 4 The di¤erence between CMM and BDH is that some variables appear in absolute di¤erence. 1 5 A more precise description of the variables used in the regressions along with sources and construction, can be found in Appendices I and II. 1 6 The di¤erence between CMM's general equilibrium case and BDH's is that the latter has the skill variables in 11
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Lastly we come to the speci…cation issue of controlling for common unobservable time e¤ects. The most ‡exible speci…cation, albeit not always e¢ cient, is yearly dummy variables. However, in order to increase e¢ ciency but maintain maximum ‡exibility we can restrict our regression by imposing a parametric speci…cation in the form of spline function, which is a kinked time trend, to control for common unobservable time e¤ects. We will see that inward FDI for our groups of interest as well as our control group have a very similar time evolution at an aggregate level. This leads us to believe that common time e¤ects can be captured by a spline speci…cation and thereby increase the e¢ ciency of our regressions. 17 
Results
Before we enter the world of regressions, it is of interest to see if there are any indications of a euro e¤ect in the raw data. The sample of 18 OECD countries is divided into the four previously mentioned groups: inward FDI ‡ows between euro countries (EMU 11) , inward FDI ‡ows to euro countries from non-euro countries (EMU 12), inward FDI ‡ows to non-euro countries from euro countries (EMU 21) and inward FDI ‡ows between non-euro countries (EMU 22).
In Figure 1 , where the Aver Corr series is used to measure FDI ‡ows in millions of US dollars, we see that all categories evolve almost at the same rate until 1999, when inward FDI drops for non-euro area countries, but continues upward for the rest. 18 It is clear from Figure 1 that inward FDI, for all the groups, follows a non-linear development over time. Actually, a simple …tted exponential trendline is able to explain 50-90 percent of the di¤erent groups, while a linear trend line has consistently 10 to 20 percent lower explanatory power. Figures 2 and 3 show the relative development of our groups of interest (EMU 11, EMU 12 and EMU 21) in absolute form. To wit, jskdj and jskdj jY dj : 1 7 See Greene Ch. 8. For estimations and a discussion of the time controls in our case, see Appendix II. 1 8 This increase occurs irrespective of the currency in which ‡ows are denominated and irrespective of who reports the ‡ows, i.e. if we use in ‡ows or out ‡ows to measure inward FDI. The same is true when it comes to the empirical estimations.
terms of our control group (EMU 22) for di¤erent time periods. It is clear that the three euro-categories exhibit a sharp relative increase around 1998-1999. Also, the spike exhibited in Figure 2 , for 1996, is not due to any large increase in the three groups of interest but rather due to large disinvestment in countries that belong in group EMU 22. More precisely it is due to US disinvestment in Sweden and the UK and due to Japanese disinvestment in the USA. These …gures demonstrate two important facts. Firstly, the development of inward FDI for the di¤erent groups is very similar and, secondly, countries belonging to the EMU area have experienced a large relative increase in inward FDI after the introduction of the euro. However, even if this relative increase is clear in the raw data we still have to examine the determinants of FDI in a multivariate context that enables us to draw conclusions about partial e¤ects of the euro. Table 3 contains the main results. Inward FDI is measured as the average of in ‡ows and out ‡ows in millions of current US dollars. Panel I shows the results from the gravity approach while Panel II presents the general equilibrium approach. The raw results are expressed in millions of dollars and give as such not a sense of magnitude but rather one of direction. However, since all estimated means are positive we can obtain elasticities for the point estimates from the original estimation by using the chain rule and gain hence a sense of magnitude as well. The fact that the elasticity point estimates have a higher t-value, can be attributed to the fact that the logarithmic form has a better "…t". Three models are estimated, both in order to gauge the di¤erent approaches of the gravity-, the more ad hoc, and the general equilibrium speci…cation in general, but also in order to see whether speci…cation issues will a¤ect our results concerning the e¤ect of the euro on FDI in particular. From the results below we see that the euro dummies are highly signi…cant across the spectrum of speci…cations. 14 Concentrating on the Gravity regression we see that, by far, the most important determinant both in magnitude and signi…cance is the variable for market size Y i . 20 This is not a surprising result, since both at an empirical as well as a theoretical level the variable of market size is considered the determinant for FDI. 21 What is a surprising feature in the regression though, is that the measure of the investing country's market size, Y j , is insigni…cant. This is a result of the inclusion of the measure for capital-or …nancing ability for the investing country, Stock j . This is probably because size is acting as a proxy, albeit an imprecise one, for …nancing ability. 22 Our general equilibrium approach give somewhat similar results to those obtained by CMM and BDH. Both the sum of GDP, as well as the squared di¤erence of GDP, variables capturing horizontal FDI, have the theoretically predicted signs and are highly signi…cant. The skill di¤erence variables, skd and skd Y d, give support to the vertical integration motivation within the theoretical framework of the knowledge capital model. The interaction term of, T radec j skd 2 , has the opposite sign of the predicted but as CMM puts it, "does not have a theoretically sharp hypothesis and, indeed, empirical support for this term is weak" (pp. 699). Lastly, the regressors measuring trade costs are both positive, which in light of their de…nition, is the expected sign. 23 The most interesting result though, for our purpose here, is the impact of the euro on FDI. Table 3 shows that inward FDI increases by 14 16 percent approximately, depending on model estimation, in the intra-EMU area (EM U 11). The increase is certainly not trivial and is of equal magnitude to the increase in trade volume found by Micco et al. (2003) as well as Flam and Nordström (2003) . As with the …ndings on trade, the regressions show that there is evidence concerning positive spillovers from EMU on partner countries, represented by EMU12 and EMU21. The magnitudes of EMU12 and EMU21 are also non-trivial with an increase in FDI in the former group of 8 percent, albeit signi…cant only at the 10% level, and the latter group by around 11 13 percent.
Regressions
2 0 The investing countries' real exchange rate is of equal magnitude but is not always signi…cant, as shown in Appendix III. Since it is not a variable of primary interest in this paper, we do not dwell on it here.
2 1 See Chakrabarti (2001). 2 2 Another interesting feature, though not reported, are the dummy variables for the creation of the European common market in the regression that are negative and signi…cant. It can be assumed that the creation of the EU made some investment non-pro…table due to the removal of trade barriers, since a similar investment somewhere in the EU could service the entire market. These results are consistent with some results obtained by Flam and Nordström (2003) where dummies for the creation of the EU tend to have a positive e¤ect on exports from non-EU countries to EU countries. 2 3 Openess is de…ned as exports+imports/GDP and proxy hence trade costs going both ways. The results indicate that we can be fairly con…dent of the positive e¤ects the creation of the EMU had on inward FDI. These positive e¤ects are not only within the designated EMU area but also a¤ects its partners. The results also suggest that positive spillovers exist and that they go in both directions. The remainder of the paper will use the Gravity regression and the Average Corrected FDI series as a reference and if any of the other estimation speci…cation have a signi…cantly di¤erent e¤ect on the results it will be duly noted.
Robustness check
In this section the robustness of the obtained results is checked to changes in country and time sample. 24 The …rst important issue is the question of whether the results truly capture a euro e¤ect or if it is something else. As mentioned earlier, the euro can a¤ect international investment through several channels. Some of these channels can have a long transmission period and not have a direct impact, while other e¤ects could be anticipated in advance. The easiest way to do this is to replace our EMU group variables with yearly dummies by group and plot their point estimates. If it is a euro e¤ect we capture it should be obvious through some form of break in the values of the point estimates in 1999. Figure 4 depicts the estimated yearly e¤ects of the various country groups. As we can see a sharp change occurs in 1999. From where the estimated yearly e¤ects are increasingly negative they are close to zero in 1999 and positive for the rest of the years. Moreover we can clearly see that EMU12, exhibits a more cyclical behavior for the period, which explains the low signi…cance in the estimations. The …gure also makes it clear that there is a jump in 1999 and not any other year, which makes us con…dent that what we are capturing in our estimations is a euro e¤ect. 25 Continuing the sensitivity analysis, we now check whether the EMU results are driven by any particular country/countries, or whether they are more widespread. 26 Countries are excluded both as receivers of investment and investors (i and j respectively). The results presented in the table are the post estimation elasticities of the EMU variables. We see clearly from Table 4 that the exclusion of Belgium-Luxembourg (BeLux) or Germany weakens the results. Further examination reveals that when both countries are excluded simultaneously the regressions do not show any euro e¤ects, which is perhaps not so surprising since we have removed the most central locations in the euro area. Continuing however with this investigation we notice an important fea-ture, namely, that if BeLux and Germany are excluded only as receivers (country i), or only as investors (country j) the results showing a positive e¤ect for the introduction of the euro remain signi…cant. These results are important for two reasons. Firstly, the aim of this paper is to investigate unidirectional FDI, hence the importance of examining the exclusion of FDI ‡ows in only one direction, and secondly these results clearly illuminate the fact that Belgium-Luxembourg and Germany act as a hub for the EMU-area inward FDI but they are not the sole driving receivers of FDI nor are they the sole driving investors. Table 5 presents some chosen results on the EMU dummies that clarify the previously made point. Firstly, in all cases the intra-EMU (EMU 11) values decrease when Germany and BeLux are excluded either as receivers or as investors. Secondly, they seem to be a driving force of both attracting FDI from non-EMU countries, as well as investing outside the euro area, since EMU 12 and EMU 21 become in turn insigni…cant. Hence what can be said about Germany and BeLux is that while they play a vital role in the euro area for inward FDI (EMU 11) as well as for spillovers (EMU 12 and EMU 21) they do not explain the entire story. However, the results suggest the need to take a closer look at these two entities.
From Table 6 , we see that a large part of European FDI circle around Germany and Belgium-Luxembourg. While the role of Germany is understandable, the entity of BeLux raises some concerns. Closer investigation shows that the majority of FDI to BeLux goes to Luxembourg and are special entity purposes (SPE's) ‡ows, i.e. ‡ows used for …nancial intermediation and not production. Unfortunately there is 20 no way to distinguish the intended end destinations in order to construct correct country pairs. What is interesting though is that the large majority of FDI both to and from BeLux concern "large" economies. To conclude this section, we may reemphasize the fact that intra-EMU e¤ects retain their signi…cance even when Germany and BeLux are excluded either as receivers of FDI or as investors. This provides more evidence that the positive e¤ects of the introduction of the euro in attracting FDI are widespread across the members rather than more concentrated in some areas. This is a topic which will be further investigated subsequently. 27 
On the Economic Geography of the Euro
In this section groups of countries will be excluded as receivers (country i) of FDI or investors (country j) in order to check for any potential concentration of inward FDI. The results obtained will be compared to similar regressions on unilateral trade, measuring exports, where Export ij denotes exports from country i to country j. 28 The purpose here is twofold. Firstly, it will give an indication of whether the introduction of the euro has induced any agglomeration e¤ects on economic activity. Agglomeration tendencies, or the lack thereof, are possibly important for policy in any future EMU-members. Moreover, the direction of trade in conjunction with the direction of FDI might be able to reveal something of the character of FDI. That is, if the directions correspond to the notion of vertical or horizontal FDI or neither of the above, keeping in mind that a signi…cant percentage of world trade, is intra…rm. 29 Secondly, this section can also be seen as being a continuation of the robustness checks performed previously.
In the new trade literature, the focus is on the geographic distribution of economic activity, where models display both forces of agglomeration as well as forces of dispersion. One key factor encouraging agglomeration is the "market access e¤ect". It states that …rms tend to locate their production in the big market and export to small markets. 30 As we have seen from the CMM and BDH estimations the variables capturing market size and symmetry (Y sum and Y d 2 ) are signi…cant determinants of FDI.
As mentioned above, the "new economic geography" models feature forces of both agglomeration as well as forces of dispersion. Their relative strengths are determined by trade costs. Mostly these models show how lower trade costs may lead to increased agglomeration of economic production. However, agglomeration forces are, as a rule, hump shaped in their relation to trade costs and depending on the starting point dispersion forces may dominate when trade 'feeness'is increased. 31 The introduction of the euro has had a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on trade volumes and it can be seen as a step towards reducing such trade costs. Yet, since we are not quite sure about our position on the hump prior to the introduction of the euro we can not make any a priori assumptions about agglomeration e¤ects.
Another way to look at is through strategies of MNE's concerning locational decisions. Indication exists that MNE's have neither pure horizontal nor pure vertical motivations for investment. They employ rather, so-called, complex strategies regarding their locational decisions. From a theoretical as well as an intuitive perspective we should expect that, for large economies the decision to locate an FDI 2 8 The dataset on exports is from the paper by Flam and Nordström (2003) . 2 9 According to Markusen (2002 there should be dominated by horizontal motivations, while the decision to locate to a small economy should be dominated by vertical motivations. If this supposition is true, we should observe that the euro e¤ect for FDI is, at least, more signi…cant for the large economies, while the euro e¤ect of trade is, at least, more signi…cant for the small economies.
Moving on to empirical considerations we can note that in order to compare our results from exports and inward FDI, the datasets have to cover the same time period and country sample. 32 The division of the sample into "big" and "small" economies is based on market size. The "big" sample of euro countries contains Germany, France, Italy and Spain, while the remaining countries are found in the "small" sample. 33 The regressions are run by excluding the "big" or "small" group …rstly as country i, i.e. as receivers of FDI and as exporters (Table 7 .1) and subsequently as country j, i.e. as investors and as receivers of exports (Table 7. 2). Comparison of the elasticities obtained in the case of exports is straightforward: we can compare the group elasticities with their full sample counterparts and be able to discern some pattern in the direction of trade. In the case of the FDI regressions it is not so straightforward, since the elasticities obtained are calculated using the chain rule and are applied to the predicted mean of the respective variable. They will however give us an indication of direction concerning FDI.
Starting with the …rst three columns in Table 7 .1 it is not clear, at …rst glance, when comparing the estimates in regressions (1), (2) and (3) that "big" countries receive more FDI ‡ows. Both subsamples experience a seemingly equiproportional increase. Remembering however the statistics concerning BeLux from Table 6 it is not clear that the entity belongs in reality to the "small" sample. The large majority of FDI come from and go to large economies, we simply can not match the exact country pairs. Hence if BeLux acts only as a haven for …nancial intermediation, it should for all practical reasons belong to the "big" sample. Regressions (4) and (5) shows the results when BeLux switches sample. The results now indicate that a large part of the inward FDI increase due to the EMU is concentrated in a few large economies. The results concerning exports in Table 7 .1 di¤er markedly from their FDI counterparts. Firstly, we see that regressions (2) and (4) are virtually identical for exports, which implies that BeLux does not drive any results when exports are concerned. Secondly, for the intra-EMU area (EMU 11 ) the coe¢ cient rises considerably, compared to the base regression, when the "big" sample is dropped as an exporter, but falls when the "small" sample is dropped. Hence, the export increase is larger for the "small" countries. For EMU 12 the opposite holds and the increase is dominated by the big countries'exports to non-EMU members.
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We now turn our attention to the opposite side of this equation, namely where do the FDI come from and to whom do the countries export to. In Table 7 .2 we see that when, BeLux changes sample, regressions (4) and (5), it is clear that the "big" economies are the ones that spawn most of the FDI, both within the EMU-area (EMU 11 ) as well as outside the same (EMU 21 ). On the other hand the regressions dealing with the export side of this experiment show an equal clear tendency where 24 the "large" economies receive larger part of the increase in exports both for EMU 11 as well as EMU 21. Overall, the results from Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate that FDI ‡ows concentrate in the "big" economies. However, within the euro-area FDI also originate mostly from the same countries. Exports, on the other hand, tend to increase more for "small" countries and are directed towards "big" countries, with the exception of euro-area exports to non-members, where the "big" members increase their exports more to "big" non members.
So, are any agglomeration tendencies apparent from this exercise? The answer to this is: only partially. It is a partial yes, since "big" economies attract a larger share of the total increase in inward FDI, after controlling for a host of factors including market size. Hence we observe an increase in the concentration of production and the sample displays agglomeration tendencies. However, exports tend to increase slightly more for small countries, which may indicate an increase in production and, in terms of economic geography, increased dispersion.
An interesting feature of the results is, however, the direction patterns of exports in conjuction with those of the FDI. These create two caveats. Firstly, it may be that perhaps intra…rm trade and vertical FDI increased in importance with the introduction of the euro. 35 Secondly, it may also be that the location decision of FDI is characterized by "third" country considerations and more attention should be given to models such as Export-Platform FDI or complex versions of the knowledge-capital model. 36 
Conclusions
Several theoretical arguments exist as to why the introduction of the euro should increase international investment. In this paper a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach has been used in order to gauge the impact of the introduction of the euro on inward FDI for the EMU members. After attempting to correct potential measurement problems and for various time e¤ects in the data we estimate that the introduction of the euro has increased inward FDI by 14 16 percent within the euro area. Moreover, the euro has had signi…cant positive spillover e¤ects on inward FDI both to and from the euro area by around 8 and 11 13 percent, respectively. The results are robust to changes in time and country sample with one exception. If the central locations of Germany and Belgium-Luxembourg are excluded simultaneously as both receivers of FDI and investors most of the euro e¤ects disappear. However, if they are excluded either as receivers or investors the euro e¤ects reappear indicating that the two countries act as a hub for FDI ‡ows in the euro area. Finally, an investigation of the economic geography of the euro is conducted by combining the inward FDI results with results obtained from export regressions. The …ndings indicate that the increase in FDI is concentrated to large economies, while the increase in exports is 
In ‡ows
Inward FDI for country i reported as an in ‡ow for i.
Out ‡ows
Inward FDI for country i reported as an out ‡ow for j.
Average
Inward FDI for country i measured as the average of above variables. Group 2, non-EMU members: Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA.
Average asymmetries
Average asymmetries are used to calculate corrected series. For each year there is a di¤erence for reported aggregate in ‡ows and out ‡ows for a certain area. This aggregate di¤erence is used to correct missing data on in ‡ows(out ‡ows) between two countries for a certain year, if their out ‡ow(in ‡ow) counterpart exists. As mentioned in the paper, some results may vary depending on the measure used for inward FDI. The …rst four diagrams show the development of FDI using In ‡ows and Out ‡ows as well as the corrected series. The …fth diagram shows the development of our groups of interest relative to the control group. The last diagram shows the proportion of world or OECD total FDI that is used in this paper. Table A is a continuation in trying to discern di¤erences in the way measurement of inward FDI a¤ect the results. One di¤erence is that the use of in ‡ows gives consistently about a 10 percent increase in explanatory power. Another is that the signi…cance of various explanatory variables di¤er between the measurements. Moreover, very little seems to change in regressions when the raw data are expanded. We can note that the IV-estimations that are used in order to correct potential 36 measurement errors are not very helpful. The instrumented variables take on entirely the attributes of the instruments. That is, IV-in ‡ows (IV-out ‡ows) look, in terms of signi…cance and magnitude, very much like the regressions using out ‡ows (in ‡ows) directly. Since no gain in consistency is apparent from the IV-estimations, 37 the end result is only loss of e¢ ciency that comes from using instruments. Lastly we can note that regression using the corrected average series seems to inherit the signi…cant attributes from both in ‡ows as well as out ‡ows, a result that was a happy surprise for once. This leads us, in the light of prior arguments, to believe it is to be preferred for measurement issues.
Tables B1 and B2 give us interesting insights concerning time controls. In Table  B1 where yearly dummies are used in order to capture common time e¤ects we can note that the EMU variables are insigni…cant. Comparing the estimates of the EMU variables with those obtained in Table B2 where the EMU variables are signi…cant, we see that the point estimates of both equations are not signi…cantly di¤erent. This leads us to believe that even if Table B1 has the most ‡exible de…nition, it is not the most e¢ cient. From Figures 1, 2 and 3 presented in the text we may easily …t common time trends to the development of FDI. We can thereby increase the e¢ ciency in our estimations by imposing a functional form on our regression. This is done in Table 3 , where the main results are presented, where two splines are introduced as a mean to cope with common time e¤ects. Our …rst spline comes from Figure 1 and is a simple quadratic exponential function which, as mentioned earlier, explains …fty to ninety percent of the variables in Figure 1 . The second spline comes from Figures 2 and 3 and is linear until 1999 and increasing thereafter, in order to control for any common structural breaks around that period. Since again the point estimates of the regressions in Table 3 and Table B1 are not signi…cantly di¤erent, we can conclude that by controlling for common time e¤ects in an e¢ cient, albeit restricted, manner the e¤ects of the EMU on inward FDI become more pronounced. In addition, both splines tend to be highly signi…cant as a rule, even if not reported. Table C1 
